

S E C R E T

30 November 1950

REPORT BY THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL FOREIGN INFORMATION STAFF

to the

DIRECTOR

on

A SPECIAL PLAN FOR EXPLOITATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPPORTUNITIES

CREATED BY THE KOREAN SITUATION

IFIS-15

State Department review completed

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

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Special Plan for Exploitation of Psychological Opportunities

Created by the Korean Situation

I. PROBLEM

A. To formulate a plan for psychological warfare and information measures in support of U.S. national objectives with respect to Korea; and to specify the means of implementation, ~~following cessation of major military operations.~~

B. To specify the organizational arrangements and delineate the policy formulation and guidance responsibilities for a UN-reorientation and re-education program.

II. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

A. For the purpose of this plan, the term "Republic of Korea" is assumed to apply to that area of Korea south of 38° North latitude and the term "North Korea" is assumed to apply to that area of Korea north of 38° North latitude.

B. U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives with Respect to Korea.

1. The objective of post-war U.S. policy with respect to Korea has consistently and unswervingly been a free and independent Korea. The cornerstone of this policy was laid at Cairo in December 1943 when the United States, the United Kingdom and China declared as one of their war aims in the Pacific, "that in due course Korea shall become free and independent." This objective was reaffirmed in the Potsdam Declaration of July 1945 to which the USSR adhered at the time of its declaration of war against Japan.

2. The United States endeavored to attain its objectives in Korea through direct collaboration with the South Korean Government so long as

2-

even collaboration appeared to hold any possibility of success. For two years after American and Soviet troops occupied Korea in September 1945, the U.S. endeavored to obtain agreement of the USSR to the abolition of the line dividing their respective zones of occupation along the 38th parallel and to the restoration of the political, economic and administrative unity of the country.

3. As a result of persistent Soviet refusal to cooperate in good faith, which frustrated the achievement of a unified, free and independent Korea, the United States, in September 1947, placed the problem of the independence of Korea before the United Nations General Assembly.

4. With the establishment in September 1948 of the "Democratic People's Republic" under the aegis of Soviet occupation forces and in direct contravention of the expressed will of the United Nations General Assembly, the immediate policy objective of the U.S. became preservation of the independent Republic of Korea under a freely elected government as a nucleus for eventual unification of the entire country on a democratic basis. This objective the U.S. has endeavored to attain by pursuing the following policies:

- a. Encouragement of international political support of the government of the Republic of Korea, particularly through the instrumentality of the United Nations.
- b. Provision of economic assistance to develop in Korea a viable and self-sufficient economy.

S E C R E T

-3-

- c. Extension of military assistance to the Republic of Korea to enable it to maintain internal security and to resist external aggression.

5. Current United States foreign policy objectives with respect to Korea derive directly from the above. Our basic objective may be defined as establishment of a unified, free and independent Korea that is politically and economically stable; is capable both of maintaining internal security and of resisting aggression; and has a government responsible to, and expressing the free will of the people.

6. In facilitating the above objectives, it is the policy of the U.S.:

- a. To support the UN decisions relative to Korea.
- b. To channel U.S. actions and efforts through the mechanism of the UN, to the extent that it is practicable.
- c. To obtain no special position for the U.S. in Korea and to retain no bases or other military installations in that country.
- d. To withdraw U.S. forces from Korea at the earliest moment consistent with fulfillment of obligations as a member of the UN.
- e. To encourage establishment of internal Korean arrangements which will serve as a beacon of hope to Asians overrun by communist forces and an affirmation

IFIS-15

-4-

of the worth of freedom to those faced with the threat of aggressive communism.

f. To strive toward ultimate disengagement from special military and economic responsibility in Korea by encouraging development of conditions permitting independent Korea to survive without material U.S. assistance.

C. U.N. Objectives with Regard to Korea.

1. The fundamental objectives of the United Nations, as expressed in resolutions of the Security Council and of the General Assembly are:

- a. To restore peace and security in Korea, and
- b. To unify and rehabilitate Korea.

2. In facilitating the accomplishment of these objectives, it is the policy of the UN:

- a. That UN troops occupy North Korea to repel aggression and to assist in the accomplishment of the objectives stated in b and c below.
- b. That conditions of stability be established and ensured in Korea.
- c. That elections, leading to the formation of a unified, independent and democratic government, be prepared and held in Korea under the auspices of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), and with the assistance of the UN command and in cooperation with the government of ROK.
- d. That UN forces should not remain in any part of Korea,

S E C R E T

SECRET

-5-

except as necessary for the achievement of h and g above.

- e. That, until UNCURK is in a position to put forward its views, the occupation should effect as few changes as possible, consistent with responsibilities attending the maintenance of law and order; leaving to the Korean people themselves, after unification has been accomplished, the task of making whatever changes they desire. (Unless modified by the firmly expressed views of UNCURK).
- f. That the rehabilitation of Korea be carried out on the basis of plans drawn up by the Economic and Social Council of UN,
 - (1) "for relief and rehabilitation on the termination of hostilities", and
 - (2) "for long-term measures to promote the economic development and social progress of Korea".
- g. That UN responsibilities with respect to Korea be discharged in a manner consonant with its role as a constructive force for peace.

III. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

A. Military operations.

Major military operations will have been concluded in a sufficiently large part of the territory of Korea to make feasible the initiation of the activities which are contemplated under this plan. Military operations will be prosecuted until the UN objectives with respect to Korea have been achieved.

IFIS-15

SECRET

-6-

Guerrilla operations may continue.

B. Administrative Arrangements.

1. The occupation of North Korea will be administered by the Commander-in-Chief of the UN Command (CINCUNC), who will utilize to a maximum UN forces other than those of the United States.

2. The Commander-in-Chief UN Command will be responsible for executing the information, re-orientation and re-education program of UN in North Korea. The Department of State will organize a field agency which will act as the operating agent of CINCUNC for the execution of this program. The Department of State will be responsible for executing the U.S. foreign information program in the ROK.

3. a. CINCUNC now has the necessary authority and the responsibility to execute a re-orientation and re-education program for North Korea.

b. The UN will channel any directives to CINCUNC through the U.S. Government, and CINCUNC will not accept directly from UN agencies any directives applicable to this plan.

IV. INTELLIGENCE

A. See Enclosure A, CIA Intelligence Memorandum No. 334, 2 October 1950 for:

1. Korean Issues Susceptible of Propaganda Exploitation in Korea.

2. Korean Issues Susceptible of Propaganda Exploitation Elsewhere.

3. Korean Psychological Predispositions and Vulnerabilities.

SECRET

- 7 -

4. Soviet Propaganda Aims with Respect to the Korean Situation.

5. Public Opinion on the Korean Situation.

V. CONCEPT OF PROPAGANDA OPERATIONS

A. General

1. There are two information responsibilities in Korea requiring U.S. participation:

a. The first is an information, re-orientation and re-education program for North Korea, carried out under the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, UN Command.

b. The second is the already existing U.S. foreign information operation in the Republic of Korea.

2. In addition, there is a U.S. responsibility for foreign information with respect to the Korean situation, as it is interpreted to the rest of the world.

3. This plan is concerned with propaganda content as it applies to the second (U.S.) program, (including propaganda about Korea to the major countries of the world), and U.S. organizational adjustments necessary for the execution of both programs.

a. The content portions, although designed to support the second program, have been prepared with a view to exploiting the US-UN relationship; they treat Korea as

IFIS-15

SECRET

S E C R E T

- 8 -

a unit; and it is intended that the content be utilized in the execution of the UN program in North Korea by including as much of it as practicable in the annex referred to in sub-paragraph b below.

b. An annex to Enclosure B of this plan should be prepared by the Department of State, utilizing the arrangements described in sub-paragraph A, 3a, b, and c of Section VI below, and stating the broad policy objectives for the first program. It should utilize the pertinent content portion (objectives and tasks) of this plan to the extent practicable.

4. Execution of the second program is to be accomplished by:
- a. Selecting a limited number of propaganda objectives and tasks, and focussing all available U.S. propaganda facilities upon implementing them.
 - b. Supporting these objectives and tasks, by creating themes on the principle of controlled decentralization.
 - c. Implementing these objectives and tasks, by an integrated propaganda campaign, which envisages:
 - (1) The maximum possible correlation of governmental decisions and actions in the political, economic and military fields with a view to capitalizing upon them to support the objectives and tasks out-

lined in this plan.

- 9 -

(2) The injection of material in support of the objectives and tasks assigned by this plan, into public statements and speeches wherever practicable.

5. Adherence to the following additional principles is deemed essential to execution:

- a. Timing of the use of themes
- b. Simplicity of content
- c. Repetition
- d. Choice of appropriate media
- e. Credibility

B. Propaganda Objectives, Tasks and Themes.

A statement of Propaganda Objectives, Tasks and Themes is contained in Enclosure B, including definitions and instructions for their use.

C. Phases of Accomplishment.

1. The accomplishment of the first program is governed by the three phases of civil affairs actions specified in Department of State outgoing cable No. 256, 28 October 1950, from Secretary of State to U.S. Ambassador Seoul, and Department of the Army outgoing cable WAR 95328, 29 October 1950 from JCS to CINCPAC.

2. For the second (U.S.) program, no division into phases of accomplishment is envisaged at the present time. Changes in the objectives and tasks stated in this plan should be made as a result of

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

- 10 -

continuing review of this plan by the Interdepartmental Foreign Information Organization (IFIO).

VI. IMPLEMENTATION

A. Organizational Arrangements

1. General

- a. The U.S. Government is now responsible for planning and executing two information programs, as described in sub-paragraph A-1 of Section V above.
- b. The first is a UN program in North Korea, for the execution of which the CINCUNC will be responsible until such time as a Government of Korea is established as a result of UN-sponsored elections. (Dept of the Army cable WAR 95328, 29 October 1950 from JCS to CINCUNC). A field agency of the Department of State will act as his operating agent, and will organize the United Nations civil information and education program in North Korea, as provided in Department of the Army cable WAR 96796, 17 November 1950, from SACOA to CINCUNC, and Department of State outgoing cable No. 351, 17 November 1950, from Secretary of State to American Embassy, Seoul.

The Department of the Army will render support to the program to include reorientation type supplies and services, personnel and funds substantially as outlined in Department of the Army cable WAR 95329, 27 October 1950, from SACOA to CINCFC.

S E C R E T

- 11 -

- c. The second program is solely a U.S. responsibility. The Department of State will be responsible for the execution of this program.
- d. Both programs will be operative concurrently. This indicates the need for precise coordination in planning and operations, as well as careful delineation of intra-staff, inter-service, and interdepartmental responsibilities.
- e. Policy formulation and guidance for both programs is a U.S. Government responsibility. Any UN policy directives should, accordingly, be channelled through the U.S. Government.
- f. Inter-departmental coordination of policy formulation and guidance for the U.S. program is accomplished through the mechanism of The Interdepartmental Foreign Information Organization. In the interest of simplicity, inter-departmental coordination to fulfill the U.S. responsibilities in connection with the UN program should be accomplished by the same means.
- g. The chief U.S. governmental agencies responsible for the execution of this plan are:

Department of State

Department of Defense (operating through the
Joint Chiefs of Staff)

Central Intelligence Agency

Economic Cooperation Administration

IFIS-15

S E C R E T

SECRET

-12-

2. Organizational Arrangements in the Far East:

- a. The Department of State will be responsible for the execution of the U.S. program in the ROK.
- b. The Commander-in-Chief, UN Command, is responsible for execution of the UN information, re-orientation and re-education program for North Korea and will coordinate between the UN program (for North Korea) and the U.S. program (for the ROK).

3. Organizational Arrangements at the State-Defense level.

- a. The Department of State should be responsible for specifying, in coordination with UNCURK and the Department of Defense, the broad objectives and tasks of the UN information, re-orientation and re-education program for North Korea.
- b. The Department of State should make provision for appropriate liaison with UNCURK, to assist in the performance of this function.
- c. Interdepartmental coordination of both programs should be provided by IFIO.

View A

- d. The channels of communication and of command between State-Defense level and CINUNC for the implementation of this plan should be agreed between the Department of State and the Department of Defense as a matter of record.

~~SECRET~~

-13-

View B

- d. The channels of communication between State-Defense level and CINCPAC for the implementation of this plan should be agreed between the Department of State and the Department of Defense as a matter of record.
 - e. All directives and guidances pertaining to the responsibility of CINCPAC for the execution of the first program should be issued through military channels (JCS to CINCPAC).
 - (f) e. Central Intelligence Agency should give intelligence support to the programs on the interdepartmental level, and should prepare and execute appropriate plans to support the U.S. program. Policy coordination should be accomplished through the mechanism of IFIO.
 - (g) f. Economic Cooperation Administration should assist in the execution of the programs. Policy coordination should be accomplished through the mechanism of IFIO.
- B. Delineation of Responsibilities for Execution.
- 1. The Department of State should:
 - a. Prepare an annex to Enclosure B of this plan, stating the broad policy objectives to govern the execution of the first program.
 - b. Provide for policy planning and operational support for the execution of the first program in coordination (View A) consultation (View B) with the Department of Defense.

IFIS-15

SECRET

S E C R E T

-14-

- c. Provide for supervisory responsibility for and execution of the second program.
 - d. Complete the organizational adjustments delineated in sub-paragraphs 3b and c of Section VI-A.
 - e. Provide for review and revision of this plan, using for that purpose the Interdepartmental Foreign Information Organization.
 - f. Furnish to appropriate international information agencies, materials in implementation of the second program.
 - g. Organize a field agency to act as the operating agent of CINCPAC for the execution of the first program, in accordance with Department of the Army cable WAR 96796, 17 November 1950 from SAOQA to CINCPAC and Department of State cable No. 351, 17 November 1950, from Secretary of State to American Embassy, Seoul.
2. The Department of Defense, acting through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should:
- a. Provide for supervisory responsibility for the execution of the first program in coordination with the Department of State.
 - b. Provide planning support for the first program.
3. The Central Intelligence Agency should:
- a. Prepare and execute appropriate plans in support of the U.S. program.

~~SECRET~~

-15-

- b. Provide coordinated intelligence in support of this plan, including appropriate review and revision of the intelligence section of this and related interdepartmental plans.
 - c. Coordinate the intelligence activities of the several government departments and agencies in support of this plan.
4. The Economic Cooperation Administration should:
- Prepare and execute appropriate plans in support of the U.S. program.

(see following page for enclosures)

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

-16-

Enclosures:

Enclosure A - CIA Intelligence Memorandum No. 334, 2 October 1950.

Enclosure B - Propaganda Objectives, Tasks and Themes, Related to Korean Events.

Annex 1 - Terms and Use

Annex 2 - General Propaganda Objectives

Annex 3 - Propaganda Objectives and Tasks for Korea

Annex 4 - Propaganda Objectives and Tasks for India, Related to Korean Events

Annex 5 - Propaganda Objectives and Tasks for China, Related to Korean Events

Annex 6 - Propaganda Objectives and Tasks for the USSR, Related to Korean Events

Annex 7 - Propaganda Objectives and Tasks for Soviet Satellites, Related to Korean Events

Annex 8 - Propaganda Objectives and Tasks for Western Europe, Related to Korean Events.

Enclosure C - Text of UN Resolution of 4 October 1950, titled "The Problem of the Independence of Korea."

SECRET